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Recent studies of U.S. Chapter 11 show it to be a relatively efficient procedure. We examine 
reorganization cases in a Continental European, creditor-oriented bankruptcy system, viz. 
Belgium, and report very different findings. Using hazard and cure regression models to 
determine what drives the length of time spent in reorganizations, we find evidence suggesting 
that courts have little impact on the screening and filtering process. In fact, virtually all drivers 
of procedure length prove to have the opposite sign of what one would expect if the procedure 
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I. Introduction 
 
During the last two decades, many European countries (including, for instance, the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Finland and Sweden) have thoroughly reformed their 
bankruptcy legislation. In most cases the guiding principle of the reform was to change a 
liquidation based procedure into a more flexible system that encourages corporate 
reorganization and preserves employment as much as possible. Typically legislators have 
hoped to achieve this by introducing or reinforcing a U.S. Chapter 11-type formal 
reorganization procedure. The ultimate goal of this process is to save companies that are 
financially distressed but economically viable. This implies the bankruptcy system should 
function as a filtering device. In the case of perfect filtering, efficient companies would always 
be reorganized and inefficient firms would be liquidated (White, 1994). In practice, asymmetric 
information causes imperfect filtering, so that dual chapter bankruptcy systems continuously 
trade-off Type I errors (allowing inefficient firms to continue operations in the reorganization 
procedure) against Type II errors (closing down viable companies in liquidation). 
 
Critics of Chapter 11-type reorganization procedures argue that the judicial system often 
allows companies which are manifestly unviable, to remain protected from creditors and 
market forces, thereby inducing substantial costs (cf. Denis and Rodgers, 2007; see Branch, 
2002 for an overview of bankruptcy costs). In some cases, the process appears to be dominated 
by creditors seeking to extract rents (Ayotte and Morrison, 2008), while courts – which are 
often underfunded and lacking in economic expertise – are biased towards keeping companies 
that should be liquidated alive (Morrison, 2007). This negative view of reorganization is 
supported by studies of Chapter 11’s key statistics. Specifically, during the 1980s virtually all 
quoted U.S. companies that went into bankruptcy filed for Chapter 11 reorganization with 
success rates of up to 86% (Weiss, 1990). During the last decade however, the Chapter 11   2
procedure seems to have increasingly turned into a mechanism to sell assets or to formalize a 
pre-negotiated take-over or merger. According to Baird and Rasmussen (2002, 2003) the 
percentage of large companies that successfully emerged from Chapter 11 has dropped to just 
24% in 2002, while the overall use of the Chapter 11 reorganization procedure has fallen by 
half compared to the 1980s. Evidence for small businesses is worse, but here overall 
reorganization success rates have always been low (see White, 1996 for a survey).  
 
Still, not all evidence is unsupportive of reorganizations. Some theoretical models show 
that the design of the bankruptcy law can enhance efficiency (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991; 
Kahl, 2002) while Chapter 11 can be efficient in filtering out unviable firms (Mooradian, 
1994). Moreover, a number of recent empirical studies – of both large and small companies – 
show that Chapter 11 reorganizations are not as expensive as is often assumed, and that the 
screening system does allow a substantial number of firms to successfully emerge in a rational 
and relatively fast way (Bris et al., 2006; Denis and Rodgers, 2007; Morrison, 2007). 
 
The functioning of European reorganization procedures may be worse than that of 
Chapter 11. The civil law bankruptcy systems in Continental Europe are more creditor-oriented 
than the debtor-friendly common law systems, and may thus be biased towards liquidation (see 
Brouwer, 2006 for a comparative study). Although international comparison of statistics is 
difficult, the use of reorganization procedures and their success rates across several European 
countries appear to be substantially lower than in the U.S. (Couwenberg, 2001). This may not 
be surprising, as recent theoretical research on bankruptcy design and efficiency has shown that 
in countries where informal reorganizations are well developed – i.e. in bank-based systems 
which dominate in Continental Europe – a court-controlled reorganization procedure is not 
necessarily beneficial (e.g. Berkovitch and Israel, 1999; Hege, 2003).    3
 
              This paper contributes to the limited empirical evidence on the functioning and the 
screening efficiency of European reorganization procedures. Specifically, we examine the 
length of time spent in reorganizations under the 1997 Belgian bankruptcy legislation, which is 
one of the most recently introduced procedures within a typical bank and small business 
dominated financial system. The time spent in a procedure is one of the literature’s most 
popular proxies for bankruptcy costs (see e.g. Franks and Torous, 1989; Tashjian et al., 1996; 
Helwege, 1999), as both direct and indirect costs are likely to be closely related to the 
procedure’s duration (Bandopadhyaya, 1994). Therefore, a growing number of empirical 
papers examine the determinants of procedure duration with hazard techniques. Several authors 
use Helwege’s (1999) sample of stock exchange quoted Chapter 11 firms (Li, 1999; Orbe et al., 
2002; Denis and Rodgers, 2007). By contrast, Bris et al. (2006) and Morrison (2007) collect 
Chapter 11 case data from bankruptcy courts in one or two U.S. states or judicial districts, 
which implies their samples predominantly consist of non-exchange quoted small businesses.  
 
Our paper is among the first to study the length of time spent in procedures outside the 
U.S.’s market-based and debtor-friendly financial system (another recent example is Leyman et 
al., 2008). We use a unique data set of all limited liability stock corporations (NV/SA)
1 that 
filed for reorganization (gerechtelijk akkoord/concordat judiciaire) between 1998 and 2003 in 
all of Belgium’s 27 judicial districts. As a result our data set is relatively large as compared to 
earlier empirical studies. Although the vast majority (98.7%) of our sample companies is non-
                                                 
1 In Belgium, there are two dominant types of limited liability companies: partnerships (BVBA/SPRL) and stock 
corporations (NV/SA). Partnerships are private companies with low capital requirements (minimum capital of 
18,550 EUR, of which only 6,200 EUR needs to be available at formation) which are managed by one or more 
officially appointed managers, usually partners. Although partnerships are allowed to file for a reorganization 
procedure, their size makes this unlikely: only about 1% of total partnership bankruptcy cases are filed under the 
reorganization code, with extremely low success rates. Stock corporations have higher capital and governance 
requirements. A minimum of 61,500 EUR needs to be available at the date of incorporation. These firms are 
managed by a board of directors with at least three members. Shares can be registered or anonymous, and are 
freely transferable.    4
exchange quoted, all Belgian stock corporations are subject to strict governance rules and 
financial statement filing requirements. We can therefore enhance our data set with detailed 
accounting and ownership information. This allows us to consider potential determinants of 
procedure length which have so far not been examined in the literature, but which could have 
an important impact: whether or not the filing company belongs to a business group
2, general 
indicators of the financial health of the filing company and the business group it belongs to (in 
casu, Altman Z”-scores), and several interaction terms to better distinguish between competing 
hypotheses. Moreover, our main focus is on cases which are transferred to liquidation 
bankruptcy, because this allows testing more directly for a link between efficiency and speed of 
the screening process, procedure length and costs of bankruptcy. An efficient system should be 
able to identify and terminate cases that eventually liquidate as quickly as possible to minimize 
dissipative costs of reorganization. Morrison (2007) also argues that the costs of reorganization 
during the duration of the procedure are expected to be highest for unsuccessful cases: for 
companies that survive, a longer duration only entails higher administrative (i.e. direct) costs; 
for companies that are liquidated, a longer case duration is likely to result in both higher direct 
costs and higher indirect costs as the firm’s assets could have been redeployed more 
productively by liquidating. However, as an extension to our analysis, we also estimate cure 
models that include all cases, regardless of their outcome (i.e. liquidation bankruptcies, 
voluntary liquidations and successful going concern reorganizations). 
 
               Previewing our main results, we find that – in line with theoretical expectations and 
evidence from other countries – the Belgian reorganization procedure has very low success and 
survival rates. More importantly, however, we find very little or no evidence of efficient 
                                                 
2 Many (even large) firms are tied together through ownership to form a business group. Especially in Continental 
Europe, South East Asia and several emerging market regions this group organizational form is important.  For 
instance, 32.4% of the 100,000 largest companies in terms of total revenue in the euro-zone have group ties (Bureau 
Van Dijk EP’s AMADEUS database, version September 2006).   5
screening by the courts. Contrary to results for U.S. Chapter 11, we find no links between 
company level characteristics such as size, liquidity or profitability and the length of time that 
an unsuccessful reorganization procedure is allowed to continue. The overall financial health 
proxy is even negatively related to procedure length, i.e. the worse a company’s financial 
health, the longer it stays –wrongfully – protected. The determinants that do turn out to be 
important (asset specificity, group membership, uncertainty, secured debt and industry 
conditions) indicate creditor or owner control of the system, rather than court induced filtering.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section II includes an overview of 
the Belgian reorganization procedure’s design and general performance. Section III discusses 
the potential determinants of procedure length. The data are described in Section IV. Section V 
contains some methodological comments and Section VI reports the empirical results. Section 
VII concludes and discusses some policy implications. 
 
 
II. The Belgian 1997 Reorganization Procedure 
 
Belgium introduced new bankruptcy legislation in 1997
3, to replace the existing Code from 
1853. In line with international best practice recommendations
4, the new Code includes a 
number of mechanisms to favour reorganization and firm survival within the insolvency 
system. One of the most important of these mechanisms – at least in theory – is the reform of 
                                                 
3 The Bankruptcy Law of August 8, 1997 and the Law on the Reorganization Procedure of July 17, 1997. Both 
came into effect on January 1, 1998. Some minor legal-technical issues were resolved by the Law of September 4, 
2002 (effective as of October 1, 2002). 
4 Best practice recommendations are listed by, for instance, the European Commission (EC, 2003) and the World 
Bank (World Bank, 2001).   6
the formal reorganization procedure.
5 In this Section, we give a brief overview of its main 
rules, and some key statistics on its functioning during the first six years of its existence.
6  
 
The new procedure has many elements in common with well-known foreign reorganization 
procedures (including U.S. Chapter 11, the French ‘Redressement Judiciaire’, and the British 
Administration or Voluntary Arrangement procedures; see e.g. Kaiser, 1996). Only the firm’s 
management can decide whether or not to file for protection under the reorganization procedure 
(i.e. only debtor-initiation is possible). In some cases the Public Prosecutor’s Office can 
initiate, although the firm’s management still has to do the actual filing. After the filing, the 
court has fifteen days to judge to what extent the restructuring of the company’s debts is 
feasible. Moreover, a company’s activities should be intrinsically profitable, it should have 
going concern potential, and there should not be any indication of fraudulent intentions.  Any 
creditor has the right to be heard by the court before a company’s application for protection is 
accepted or denied. If a company is allowed to enter the reorganization procedure, it receives 
temporary protection from creditors of up to six months (which can be prolonged to nine 
months). The court appoints an administrator who assists the management in drafting a 
reorganization plan and who needs to authorize certain decisions and payments necessary for 
the continuation of the company’s activities. The exact responsibilities of the administrator are 
set by the court on a case-specific basis. The court’s ruling is published in the official State 
Bulletin (Belgisch Staatsblad/Moniteur Belge) and in the local press. All creditors and other 
interested parties have full access to the case files. Court protection establishes a stay on the 
execution of all debt-holders’ claims (including those of secured and other senior creditor 
classes), but it does not stop the payment of interests on existing debt. The design of a 
                                                 
5 Although a reorganization procedure exists since 1887 and was updated in 1946, in practice it had been in disuse 
for decades. 
6 See Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2008) for a more detailed analysis of the 1997 legal reform and its potential 
economic consequences.   7
reorganization plan is the exclusive right of the management and the administrator, and the plan 
has to be submitted to court before the end of the temporary protection period. A reorganization 
plan consists of a detailed analysis of the company’s condition, proposals to ensure the 
company’s survival and repayment schedules for all creditors. All creditors affected by the plan 
can vote in a general assembly of creditors, in which each creditor has one vote, regardless of 
the size of the claim or the claim’s priority. The approval of the plan requires a simple majority 
of votes, although these votes also need to represent a majority of the total amount of debts 
outstanding. The approval of the creditors is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
court’s confirmation of the plan: the court can reject the plan, even if the majority of the 
creditors are in favour of it. If the court confirms the reorganization plan, the company enters a 
protection period of typically two years (which can be prolonged to three years) during which 
the plan is implemented. Creditors who oppose the plan are subjected to it after the formal 
confirmation by the court. 
 
However, several classes of senior claimants, including mortgage-holders (i.e. banks), 
suppliers with retention of title rights on delivered goods and the tax administration need to 
approve the reorganization plan individually. Strictly speaking, an individual secured creditor 
cannot veto the confirmation of a plan if the majority of creditors and the court have given their 
approval. However, a secured creditor that has not approved the plan is not subjected to the 
plan’s conditions after the reorganization procedure has ended. In other words, non-approving 
secured creditors can execute their claims for the full amount as soon as the company is no 
longer protected by the court. In practice, this implies that if an important secured creditor does 
not want to support the plan, the company’s long term survival chances are virtually zero, 
which also lowers the incentives of all other creditors to accept a reduction of their claims 
under the reorganization plan. As there is no feasible way to bypass the secured creditors’ de   8
facto hold-up rights (e.g. a cram down procedure), the administrator and the firm’s 
management/shareholders need to convince secured creditors to support reorganization in the 
early stages of the procedure. The power of unsecured creditors is much smaller: a plan can be 
confirmed by the court and enforced against the will of some of the unsecured creditors. 
Contrary to the case of secured creditors, unsecured creditors who vote against the 
reorganization plan do not have the right to exercise their full claims after the procedure has 
ended. They do have the right to file a request for modification of a plan if he/she can show that 
the execution of this plan may cause him/her financial difficulties. However, plan modifications 
that influence the position of creditors have to be approved by the general assembly of creditors 
under the same rules as for the original plan (with the same advantages for secured creditors), 
so this is unlikely to be very helpful. A final option (which is also open to secured creditors, the 
administrator or management) is to request termination of the reorganization procedure if it can 
be shown that the terms of the plan are not being met or will be impossible to meet in the 
future. If the court accepts this request, the reorganization procedure is ended and the stay on 
creditors’ action against the company is removed. This almost invariably leads to a liquidation-
type bankruptcy – or, in rare cases, to a voluntary liquidation
7 – which may be initiated 
immediately, even during the court session concerning termination of the reorganization 
procedure. In a liquidation-type bankruptcy the recovery rate of unsecured debt holders is 
expected to be extremely low, hence they have little incentive to prefer this scenario.  
 
Some initial indications on the reorganization procedure’s functioning are given in 
Table 1. Using data from the official State Bulletin (see Section IV for more information on 
                                                 
7 Voluntary liquidation procedures can be an alternative for liquidation-type bankruptcies, but not in all cases. In 
some voluntary liquidations all (or almost all) creditors of the liquidating company are paid in full, which implies 
that the liquidation value of the company’s assets is larger than that of its liabilities. In these cases, there is no real 
default. Insolvent companies can use the voluntary liquidation procedure as an alternative for bankruptcy 
(deficitaire vereffening) only if strict conditions are met. For instance, all creditors have to approve the liquidation 
and have the right to appeal for bankruptcy if they can show that this would improve their recovery chances. If 
they feel that the procedure is only used to avoid bankruptcy, the Commercial Court can terminate the voluntary 
liquidation and transfer the company to the bankruptcy procedure.   9
data collection), it shows some key statistics. Panel A of Table 1 reports the outcome of all 
reorganization cases of limited liability stock corporations which were initiated in the first six 
years after the new procedure came into effect (1998-2003). Next to these 365 companies that 
were allowed into the procedure, a small number of firms filed for reorganization but were 
turned down by the court: the State Bulletin records only 24 cases for which reorganization was 
rejected and a liquidation-type bankruptcy procedure was started instead. Hence the pre-entry 
screening of the reorganization procedure – which is quite strict in e.g. Japan (Eisenberg and 
Tagashira, 1994; Helwege and Packer, 2003) or Sweden (Sundgren, 1998) – appears to be very 
limited in Belgium. 
 
******************* 
Table 1 about here 
******************* 
 
The most striking observation in Panel 1 is that 260 out of 329 completed cases (79.0%) 
have ended up in the liquidation-type bankruptcy procedure. For comparison, Couwenberg 
(2001) reports liquidation rates in reorganization of 46% for the UK and 72% for France.
8 Only 
12.2% of the completed cases exits the procedure as going concern, which is extremely low by 
any standard. 
 
Panel B of Table 1 reports statistics on the duration of all completed reorganization 
cases during our sample period. The average time spent in the reorganization procedure is 12.3 
months (median 7.6 months). A company exiting as a going concern takes 32.1 months on 
average to complete the procedure, with a minimum of 10.3 months and a maximum of more 
than 4 years. The same degree of disparity can also be found for cases that end up in 
liquidation-type bankruptcy: the average is 9.4 months, but individual case lengths vary from a 
                                                 
8 It should be mentioned that comparison across countries is difficult because of the lack of uniformity in sample 
size, average company size, sampling period, country specific legal differences, etc.   10
few weeks to more than 51 months. Hence some companies can linger for several years in 
reorganization protection before they are liquidated. The average duration of the Belgian 
procedure does not compare favourably to those reported in earlier studies: in the sample of 
quoted companies used by Li (1999) and Orbe et al. (2002), the average time to (successful) 
emergence is about 20 months. Morrison (2007) documents that more than 75% of the 
unsuccessful small business Chapter 11 cases in his sample are shut down in less than 5 months 
and 94% in less than 9 months. The reorganization cases in the sample of Bris et al. (2006) 
which are converted to Chapter 7 stay in Chapter 11 for 6.4 months on average. It should be 
remarked that the longer procedure length for Belgium could be partly due to the existence and 
length of the temporary protection period during which the debtor and the administrator can 
draw up a plan. This makes it unlikely for a procedure to be terminated during the first months 
as is often the case in the U.S. 
 
 
III. Determinants of procedure length 
 
The existing literature suggests that the length of time spent in a reorganization procedure is 
determined by both company-specific and external information, which includes ownership data, 
industry-specific and court-specific characteristics. The description of the procedure in the 
previous Section also shows that the perspectives of the owner (who decides about initiation), 
the creditors and the court are potentially important. This Section formulates hypotheses 
concerning the explanatory variables used in the multivariate tests of Section VI that will allow 
us to gain more insight into the actual role of the different parties. An overview of the 
variables’ definitions is contained in Table 2. 
   11
Size – The relative importance of the direct costs which the formal reorganization procedure 
typically entails are inversely related to firm size (Branch, 2002; Ravid and Sundgren, 1998), 
which implies that larger companies, ceteris paribus, should be capable of bearing the costs for 
a longer period of time. Moreover, from the creditors’ (e.g. banks) point of view, the incentive 
to continue to cooperate with a large firm’s reorganization procedure should be higher because 
larger companies are (a) likely to be clients with a better bank relationship (cf. Rajan, 1992) 
and (b) the potential gain of cooperation is larger. Finally, assessing the companies’ viability 
may be more complex for larger cases. All of the preceding arguments predict a positive 
relationship between company size and the length of time spent in the reorganization 
procedure. On the other hand, judges may be more interested and motivated to handle larger 
cases (cf. Bris et al., 2006), which would speed up the decision process and could lead to a 
negative relationship between size and procedure length. 
 
Profitability – A company’s current profitability may proxy for future profitability and hence 
for going concern value (Helwege and Packer, 2003). Therefore one could argue that 
profitability and the probability of staying in the reorganization procedure should be positively 
related. By contrast, it should also be easier to find a buyer for more profitable operations, 
implying a negative relationship between profitability and time spent in reorganization.  
 
Liquidity – Kim and Kim (1999) argue that, ceteris paribus, creditor’s incentives to cooperate 
in reorganization are lower if the company has many assets which can easily be distributed in a 
liquidation procedure. This logic implies a negative relationship between liquidity and the 
length of the reorganization procedure. On the other hand, the liquidity ratio could also be 
regarded as an inverse measure of the severity of the financial difficulties. This latter view 
would predict a positive relationship.   12
 
Leverage – As the overall level of leverage is an indicator of the severity of the financial 
difficulties the company faces, it could be hypothesized that filing companies with higher 
leverage levels are more quickly removed from the reorganization procedure. However, the 
degree of leverage can also be regarded as a proxy for the complexity of the reorganization 
problem (cf. Li, 1999), implying the opposite relationship (i.e. it takes longer to assess whether 
or not more highly levered companies can be reorganized).  
 
Asset specificity – In general, company or industry specific tangible assets (such as machinery) 
are assumed to be relatively illiquid, i.e. the number of potential buyers is limited so that they 
are difficult to sell at a fair price during a ‘fire sale’ (Berger et al., 1996). The reorganization 
procedure gives companies the opportunity to continue to use these specific assets, which 
preserves going concern value (Baird and Morrison, 2005). Hence, companies with high 
specific asset levels should be more successful in convincing creditors to keep supporting 
reorganization, in view of their low liquidation value. This could lead to a positive relationship 
between asset specificity and the duration of the procedure.  
 
Financial health – As already mentioned, the profitability, liquidity and leverage variables 
discussed above can also be interpreted as proxies for the severity of the financial problems. 
However, in the accounting and finance literature, financial health is often measured by a score 
based on a failure prediction model. The models developed by Altman (1968) and Ohlson 
(1980) are among the most influential examples of these types of models. The Z”-score which 
is used in this paper, an adjusted version of the Altman (1968) Z-score developed for non-stock 
exchange quoted companies (Altman, 1993), can be regarded as an encompassing measure 
containing the relevant information of the individual variables within the bankruptcy prediction   13
model. The worse the financial health of the company, ceteris paribus, the lower the chances of 
recovery are likely to be. A procedure with effective filtering should be able to remove the 
companies with the worst financial situation relatively quickly. If this is the case, the time spent 
in reorganization before liquidation should be positively related to the financial health proxy, as 
higher Z”-scores indicate stronger financial health. On the other hand, if the procedure is used 
as a mechanism to sell companies (or parts of companies), the opposite relationship could hold 
as firms in better financial health should be easier to sell. 
 
Uncertainty – The larger the degree of uncertainty about the value (or potential profitability) of 
the filing company, the more difficult it may be for the court to assess the company’s viability, 
and hence the longer it should take to exercise the option to shut down and liquidate (Morrison, 
2007). On the other hand, creditors – especially secured creditors such as banks – may be more 
in favour of fast liquidation if uncertainty is high, thus eliminating the risk of future losses. As 
a proxy for uncertainty, we compute the average standard deviation of the operating profit 
margin within the industry over the last three fiscal years before the filing date. 
 
Secured debt – As discussed above, secured creditors may have incentives to push for 
liquidation. Bergström et al. (2002) show that well-secured creditors are more likely to oppose 
reorganization of Finnish SMEs. Ayotte and Morrison (2008) find evidence of a secured 
creditor-driven fire-sale bias in large U.S. Chapter 11 cases: the presence of secured creditors 
substantially decreases the probability of a traditional reorganization, but increases the 
likelihood of a quick sale. We therefore expect the secured debt ratio (defined as secured debt 
to total assets) to be negatively related to procedure length. 
   14
Industry conditions – Several authors (including Maksimovic and Phillips, 1998; Routledge and 
Gadenne, 2000 and Campbell, 1996) suggest that the economic conditions in a reorganizing 
company’s industry could influence its survival chances. Companies in growing, highly 
profitable industries may be able to continue operations for a longer time if courts allow these 
firms more time to reorganize. However, it is also possible that creditors are less prone to 
liquidate early as they are less likely to lose value by postponing liquidation if the business 
climate is beneficial. By contrast, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that the liquidation value of 
assets in a booming industry is higher because of a larger number of potential buyers with 
sufficient cash flows. If this latter effect dominates, companies in stronger industries may be 
liquidated sooner than firms with activities in struggling industries. We include the average 
sales growth and average operating performance margin of the reorganizing company’s 
industry as proxies for the state of the industry.
9 
 
Business group membership – In many Continental European countries, legally independent 
companies are often tied together through pyramidal ownership structures or cross-
participations (La Porta et al., 1999). Because each group member company has separate 
limited liability, each member can individually file for bankruptcy, while the group’s other 
activities remain unharmed (cf. Bianco and Nicodano, 2006). Creditors, including banks, may 
have stronger incentives to cooperate in a restructuring effort of a business group member as 
compared to the reorganization of a stand-alone company if they value their relationship to the 
group as a whole. This would lead to a positive link between group membership and time spent 
in reorganization. Alternatively, it can also be hypothesized that business groups are able to use 
their networks to find potential buyers for the member company’s assets (within or outside of 
the group structure) more quickly than stand-alone companies, resulting in a negative 
                                                 
9 Remaining industry effects will be controlled for by dummies.   15
relationship between procedure duration and group membership. Groups may also wish to 
solve the problem quickly to limit the damage to their reputation.  
 
However, the preceding arguments implicitly presume that the group as a whole is in 
reasonably good financial health. In fact, if the group’s financial condition is weak, creditors’ 
opportunities for future cooperation dwindle, while moral hazard problems and incentives for 
the group to shift resources away from the subsidiary mount. Creditors anticipating such 
behaviour may then favour early liquidation. By contrast, if the use of networks is an important 
force driving procedure duration, financially weak groups are likely less able to find potential 
buyers quickly. In other words, the group’s capacity to shorten the procedure would be smaller. 
Analogous to the filing company financial health variable, we use the Altman Z”-score of the 
most important group member company
10 as a proxy for group financial health. 
 
Court specific variables – The fact that bankruptcy courts have a considerable amount of 
leeway in making key procedure decisions can give rise to differences in outcome from district 
to district. It seems inevitable that some courts are stricter than others (cf. Sundgren, 1998). 
Evans (2003) empirically confirms that judges’ discretionary actions indeed have a significant 
effect on the outcome of U.S. Chapter 11 procedures.  The court’s stance could, for instance, 
depend on the local socio-economic environment, i.e. in high unemployment areas the 
willingness to consider reorganization might be higher. The size of Belgium’s judicial districts 
also varies widely, implying that courts in areas with limited economic activity have very little 
experience in handling reorganization cases, while others deal with these issues as a matter of 
routine. As a downside, these experienced courts may have too many cases to handle relative to 
                                                 
10 Following Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2006) we use the financial statements of the sample company’s 
ultimate corporate owner to compute the group financial health proxy. If the ultimate corporate owner is a 
financial holding company (i.e. a control vehicle without substantial sales of its own) we use the financial 
statements of the group member company with the largest amount of sales instead.   16
their often limited resources. All of the country’s 27 judicial districts handled reorganization 
cases during our sample period, but the number of cases ranges from 1 (Ypres and 
Neufchâteau) to 50 (Antwerp). To control for these issues, we include two variables. The first 
one (Cases per judge) is a measure of judicial experience, proxied by the average number of 
reorganization cases in the district per full-time bankruptcy judge during our sample period. 
The second is a dummy variable (Region) has a value of 1 if the court is situated in an area with 
an average unemployment rate during the sample period higher than the national median (10 
districts, all situated in the southern part of the country).  
 
******************* 




IV. Data and sample 
 
All main court decisions in a reorganization case (e.g. start/end/extension of preliminary 
protection period, plan confirmation, end/extension of plan protection period) are published in 
the official State Bulletin (Belgisch Staatsblad/Moniteur Belge). The State Bulletin also lists in 
which judicial district a case has been filed, and reports general information on the filing 
company and the court appointed administrator. Using the online database of the Ministry of 
Justice we compile a nationwide list of all reorganization cases involving limited liability stock 
corporations (NV/SA)
11 initiated between the introduction date of the procedure (Jan 1st, 1998) 
and the end of 2003. This results in a total of 365 cases. We first focus on companies which end 
up in the liquidation-type bankruptcy procedure, which is by far the most likely outcome (260 
cases out of 365, cf. Table 1).  As mentioned above, looking solely at these cases allows for 
                                                 
11 See footnote 1.    17
clean testing of the efficiency of the system, as an efficient system should be able to quickly 
identify and terminate unviable cases. 
 
             Financial statement data on the companies involved and the industries in which they 
are active are obtained from private data provider Bureau Van Dijk’s BelFirst database. 
Following common practice, we use data from the last financial statement the company filed 
before the initial request for reorganization or bankruptcy protection. To ensure a sufficient 
level of data quality, we exclude companies for which the time period between the financial 
statement date and the judicial filing date is longer than 18 months, and several types of 
financial or holding companies. Within this sample, following Helwege (1999) and Bris et al. 
(2006), we only identify unique cases. In our setting this implies we have to remove several 
blocks of closely related companies that file for reorganization bankruptcy together. Including 
these cases could give rise to two problems. Firstly, the duration and the outcome of the 
reorganization procedures is the same for all companies in a certain block, which would lead to 
clustering of the dependent variable. Secondly, using individual company financial statement 
data as explanatory variables is likely to be inappropriate as courts appear to judge these blocks 
of cases as one. As a result, we end up with a testable sample of 127 unique reorganization 
cases which are transferred to the liquidation-type bankruptcy procedure.
12 To the best of our 




                                                 
12 Of these 127 companies only two are stock-exchange quoted. As the treatment of quoted firms may be 
somewhat different because of, for instance, lower information asymmetry, a higher level of public attention, more 
dispersed ownership, etc., we deleted these two observations from the data set as a robustness check. All results 
and findings remain unchanged. 
13 For comparison, the sample of Bris et al. (2006) contains 42 Chapter 11 cases which are converted to Chapter 7, 
the sample of Morrison (2007) contains 19 of such cases plus 40 dismissals (i.e. 59 shut downs in total); in Denis 
and Rodgers (2007)’s sample 37 Chapter 11 cases end up in liquidation; in Leyman et al. (2008), 119 cases fail.   18
Next, we extend our sample to also include companies that do not end up in liquidation 
bankruptcy to get a broader picture of the procedure. Collecting information for all cases that 
meet the data requirements listed above leads to an additional 13 testable observations for 
companies that went into voluntary liquidation (cf. footnote 7) and 18 testable observations for 
companies that successfully reorganized as a going concern, extending the total sample to 158 
cases. For all of these companies, we compute the variables discussed in the previous Section 
(see Table 2 for definitions).  
 
  Table 3 contains information on the sample’s size and industry distribution and 
summary statistics on all explanatory variables. Panel A reports that the mean total asset size of 
our sample companies is 4.5 million euros (median of 1.3 million), which is relatively large for 
a sample of predominantly non-exchange quoted companies.
14 A closer view at the size 
distribution shows that almost half of our sample companies have total assets of 0.5 to 2.5 
million euros. 20.9% of all companies are micro firms, while only 7.6% (i.e. 12 companies) 
have total assets in excess of 10 million euros. The sample’s industry composition in Table 3 
Panel B shows that more than two thirds of all companies are active in manufacturing, 
construction and trade. This is consistent with the view that a formal reorganization procedure 
is usually most applicable to companies in traditional industries (cf. Baird and Rasmussen, 
2003). Finally, Panel C reports the mean, median and standard deviations of all continuous 
explanatory variables and the mean of all dummy variables.
15 It can be observed that the 
companies filing for reorganization, on average, are in very poor financial health. Not 
unexpectedly for companies applying for formal reorganization protection, they are generating 
losses (average profitability ratio of -0.14) and have liquidity problems (average quick ratio 
                                                 
14 For comparison, the average total asset size in Morrison’s (2007) small business sample is 0.66 million dollars 
(median of 0.11 million); the average of Bris et al.’s (2007) small and large business sample is 19.8 million dollars 
(median of 1.2 million). 
15 The continuous variables were winsorized at 5 and 95% to reduce the impact of outliers.   19
well below 1). Furthermore they are very highly levered. The average total liabilities ratio is 
1.05, which implies that the average shareholders’ equity is negative. The financial health 
proxy (based on an Altman Z”-score) also points to very severe difficulties, making recovery as 
a going concern highly unlikely.
16 This confirms the practitioners’ view that many companies 
wait too long before filing for reorganization protection, for instance because of negative 
reputation effects caused by the so-called stigma of failure which is present throughout the 
European Union (European Commission, 2002; Brouwer, 2006). The bad condition of the 
filing companies, as indicated by the univariate statistics, again points to lack of pre-entry 
screening by the courts. Interestingly, for the companies with business group ties (39 out of 158 
cases), it can be observed that the group financial health proxy indicates problems as well, 
although to a lesser extent than at the level of the filing company itself. This is consistent with 
empirical evidence from Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2006) who find that Belgian business 
groups tend to support their struggling subsidiaries and only let them file for reorganization or 
bankruptcy if the group’s financial situation forces it to do so. 
 
******************* 





One of the most commonly used techniques in the literature on bankruptcy procedure duration 
are accelerated failure time regression models (see Kiefer, 1988 for a discussion of the 
modeling of economic duration data). The dependent variable in these types of models is the 
natural logarithm of the number of days or months spent in the procedure. Following, for 
                                                 
16 The median Z”-score in our sample is -2.18, while Altman (1993) classifies scores of below 1.10 as indicating 
severe problems.   20
instance, Bandopadhyaya (1994) and Denis and Rodgers (2007) we assume a Weibull 
distribution for the baseline hazard function h0
17:  
h0(t) = λ γ t 
λ-1                       ( 1 )  
where t = time, λ = shape parameter and γ = scale parameter (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1999). 
 
The accelerated failure time form of equation (1) can be written as: 
h(t, x, β, λ) = λ t 
λ–1 ( ) ++ 01 12 2 -λβ+β x β x. . . e                     ( 2 )  
where x = covariates,  β = coefficients estimated in the accelerated failure time model. 
 
In our context, h(t)  is the conditional probability that the reorganizing company is 
transferred to the liquidation-type bankruptcy procedure given that it has stayed in the 
reorganization procedure up to time t. Intuitively, equation (2) links the hazard of being 
removed from the reorganization procedure to the values of the covariates (x). SAS transforms 
equation (2) to link the time spent in the procedure with the covariates. The parameters are 
estimated by maximum likelihood using a Newton-Raphson algorithm. Note that coefficients in 
this type of accelerated failure time can be interpreted directly, i.e. a positive β points to a 
longer period of time spent (and thus to a lower hazard rate), and vice versa. The survivorship 
function S corresponding to (2) is: 
S(t, x, β, λ) =  () { } exp exp⎡⎤ ++ ⎣⎦
λ
01 12 2 -t -λ β + β x β x ...               (3)
 
 
The use of standard accelerated failure time models is only appropriate if all 
observations experience the event (in our case, end up in liquidation). If data on all available 
cases is used, we estimate logistic-Weibull mixture cure models that simultaneously model the 
                                                 
17 As a robustness check, we reestimate all models assuming an exponential, log-logistic or gamma distribution for 
the baseline hazard function. Results are very similar.   21
probability that a company is not successful and the length of time spent in the procedure, 
implementing Corbière and Joly’s (2007) macro for SAS. In other words, this takes into 
account that the companies that eventually survived as going concerns were at risk of failing 
and going into liquidation as long as they were in the reorganization procedure (Morrison, 
2007). As a result, the unconditional survival function of the mixture cure model for the entire 
population is: 
S(t|x,z) = π(z) S(t|U = 1,x) + 1 – π(z)                   (4) 
where π(z) = probability that the procedure will be unsuccessful, given a covariate vector (z) 
and S(t|U=1,x) = the survival function for unsuccessful cases given a covariate vector (x). 
 
 
VI. Tests and results 
 
The results of Weibull accelerated failure time models for the length of cases ending up in 
liquidation bankruptcy are reported in Table 4. The first model (model A) only contains the 
basic company-specific variables which can be computed from the firm’s financial statements 
(size, profitability, liquidity, leverage and asset specificity). Although in theory each of these 
variables could be related to a company’s survival chances and thus to the court’s decisions 
(see Section III), it turns out that they are only very weakly related to the time spent before 
transfer to the liquidation procedure. The first four of these variables are not significant.
18 By 
                                                 
18 W.r.t. profitability, our results differ from those of Leyman et al. (2008), who do find a significant positive 
relationship between profitability and case duration for a sample of 44 micro and small sized Belgian companies, 
which is consistent with efficient filtering: the least profitable companies are removed first. One possible 
explanation for this difference could be the fact that Leyman et al. (2008) only study cases in the post-
confirmation stage of the procedure, while we also include those cases that do not succeed in drafting a confirmed 
reorganization plan (which is the case for the vast majority of all started reorganization procedures). Moreover, the 
average size of the companies in Leyman et al.’s (2008) sample is substantially smaller than that of our sample 
companies. It could be hypothesized that creditors are only interested in exercising control over a procedure if 
their potential gains (or their potential losses if they allow reorganization to continue) are large enough to warrant 
the effort. It is therefore possible that the reorganization procedure is less creditor-driven in micro sized firms – 
and therefore exhibits better filtering performance – than in small, median and large sized cases. As a robustness 
check we run a number of additional models on a sub-sample of post-confirmation cases only (not reported,   22
contrast, asset specificity is significant in all models in Tables 4 and 5. Its positive sign is as 
expected: companies with relatively many specific assets, which are difficult to liquidate at a 
good price, stay in reorganization longer. Leverage is significant at the 10% level in some of 
the models, with a positive sign. If Leverage is interpreted as a proxy for case complexity, the 
positive sign is as expected in the literature: more complex cases need more time to be 
assessed. If Leverage is seen as a proxy for the severity of financial difficulties, the positive 
sign is unexpected: companies in worse financial health remain in the procedure for a longer 
period of time.  
 
Also note that the shape parameter (larger than 1) indicates that the hazard increases 
with time. Bandopadhyaya (1994) argues this positive duration dependence in the hazard arises 
directly from the way reorganization cases are handled: immediately after the filing date all 
parties involved (judges, administrators and creditors) need time to analyze and assess the 
company’s situation, implying that the hazard of being removed from the procedure is 
relatively low. As time progresses, and the company needs to formulate or execute a 
reorganization plan, the probability of exit increases. 
 
******************* 
Table 4 about here 
******************* 
 
In model B, we add factors which do not directly relate to the financial condition of the 
company: the group membership variable (Group)
19, the court specific variables (Cases per 
                                                                                                                                                           
available upon request). Most financial variables (Liquidity, Leverage, Asset specificity and Financial health) are 
not significantly related to procedure duration, although it should be noted that the power of the models is low due 
to the small number of observations (35). In one of the models, Profitability is significant at the 10% level with a 
positive sign, which is weak evidence indicating that the procedure may be more geared towards continuation as a 
going concern in the post-confirmation period for our sample of corporations as well. 
19 To avoid multicollinearity problems which could arise from the fact that group member companies differ 
significantly from stand-alone companies (for instance in terms of size), the group variable used in the models of 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 is an instrumental variable (the residual of a logistic regression model with the group dummy as   23
judge and Region), the industry risk proxy (Uncertainty) and one of the measures of industry 
conditions (Industry sales growth). Model B’ is identical to model B, except for the fact that it 
includes an alternative industry condition variable (Industry profit margin). Group membership 
is a highly significant determinant of the length of time spent in an unsuccessful reorganization 
procedure: ceteris paribus, group member firms are liquidated more quickly than stand-alone 
companies. The court-specific variables are not significant. Contrary to the findings of 
Morrison (2007), Uncertainty is highly significant with a negative sign: the higher the degree of 
uncertainty, the faster the company is liquidated. Morrison (2007) argues that the positive 
relationship he finds between uncertainty and the procedure length is a strong signal of the 
rationality of the U.S. Chapter 11 process: judges give cases with high uncertainty the 
necessary time to prove they can be reorganized. Our findings may indicate that in a bank-
based system the stricter stance of the creditors towards uncertain cases dominates, i.e. 
creditors (banks) may be less supportive of a reorganization procedure if the chances that 
substantial value may be lost in the future are high. As in practice reorganization is unfeasible 
without bank support, the court then has little choice but to terminate the procedure.  
 
The industry condition variables, Industry sales growth in model B and Industry profit 
margin in model B’ are both positively related to the length of the procedure, although Industry 
profit margin is not significant at the 10% level (p-value is 0.109). The model specification 
using sales growth therefore has a substantially better fit, as measured by the log likelihood and 
the likelihood ratio test. To gain more insight into the relationships between these industry-
specific variables and the length of the procedure, we interact them with Uncertainty in models 
C and C’. The interaction terms (Uncertainty*Industry sales growth and Uncertainty*Industry 
profit margin) are highly significant with a positive sign. This could imply that companies in 
                                                                                                                                                           
the dependent variable and all other variables as explanatory variables). Robustness checks show that using the 
actual dummy variable would lead to similar results.   24
industries with a higher degree of uncertainty are liquidated sooner, but that this effect is less 
outspoken if the prospects of the industry – proxied by sales growth or profit margin – are 
good. In other words, courts or creditors are less eager to stop supporting companies with a 
high degree of uncertainty if the industry outlook is positive.
20  
 
In model D, we added the secured debt ratio instead of an industry-specific variable. Secured 
debt is negatively related to procedure length, which is consistent with the view that secured 
creditors have incentives to push for liquidation as soon as possible. The Uncertainty*Secured 
debt interaction term in model D’ is also significantly negative (at the 10% level). This implies 
that the negative impact of Uncertainty on the length of the procedure becomes stronger as the 
secured debt ratio rises: secured creditors are more likely to prefer liquidation if there is more 
uncertainty. To further examine the validity of this interpretation, we split up the 
Uncertainty*Secured debt interaction term using dummy variables expressing whether or not 
the industry outlook is weak.
21 Results are reported as model E in Table 5. Uncertainty itself 
remains highly significantly negative, but the interaction with Secured debt is only significant 
(at the 1% level) when the industry outlook is weak (Uncertainty*Secured debt*Weak industry 
outlook). All of these negative relationships between the secured debt ratio and the time to the 
end of the reorganization procedure are consistent with a secured-creditor driven sale bias (cf. 
                                                 
20 To ascertain the economic significance and clarify the interpretation of our results, we compute the elasticity for 
a one unit change in a certain variable in model C, if all other variables would have median values. The elasticities 
of Size, Profitability and Liquidity are virtually zero (which makes sense, in view of the fact that they are not 
significant): e.g. an increase of Profitability by 0.01 reduces case duration by about 0.2 days. For the significant 
variables, the elasticities appear to be economically reasonable: an increase of 0.01 in the leverage ratio increases 
the duration by 0.9 days; an increase of 0.01 in Asset specificity adds 2.6 days and a shift from non-group 
affiliated to group-affiliated reduces the procedure length by 64 days. W.r.t. Uncertainty there are two effects: a 
direct one and an indirect one through the interaction term. Taking both into account, an increase of 0.01 in the 
uncertainty measure reduces case duration by 12.4 days. An increase of the industry sales growth (which only 
enters the model via the interaction term) by 0.01 adds 7.0 days to procedure length. 
21 We define industries within the lowest quartile of sales growth of all industries in our sample as having weak 
industry outlook and those within the upper three quartiles as having normal or strong industry outlook. 
Robustness checks show that other cut-offs (e.g. 20/80 or 33/66) lead to very comparable results.   25
Ayotte and Morrison, 2008).
22,23 The consequences of such a sale bias for the value 
preservation ability of the Belgian insolvency system are not clear, but are unlikely to be 
beneficial. One important element could be the question whether or not many companies are 
sold piecemeal – in which case any remaining going concern value is destroyed – or as a whole 
– in which case at least some going concern value may be preserved. The Belgian insolvency 
system does not have a formalized going concern sale comparable to, for instance, a Section 
363 sale in the U.S. or a “plan de cession” in France. The State Bulletin therefore does not 
record whether a bankrupt company is sold piecemeal or as a whole. Still, recent empirical 
evidence shows that even going concern sales destroy a lot of value compared to companies 
that successfully reorganize. LoPucki and Doherty (2007) show that recovery rates of Section 
363 sales of large publicly traded companies are only 29% of book value, compared to 75% for 
companies that reorganize in the period 2000-2004. They argue this could be due to the fact 
that bids are often too low because of limited liquidity in the market (often there is only a single 
bidder) and incentives for managers and professional advisors to support underpriced sales. 
LoPucki and Doherty also point out that the efficiency of the market for private companies is 
likely to be even lower, which implies that the loss of value could be even worse for our sample 
companies. Blazy et al. (2008) compare recovery rates across going concern sales, liquidations 
and reorganizations for a sample of French SMEs and find (in the period 1995-2005) hardly 
any difference between recovery rates in going concern sales and piecemeal liquidations, while 
                                                 
22 Even though Secured debt is significant in our analysis, our secured debt ratio is financial statement based and 
therefore likely to underestimate the true importance of secured debt. It can be expected that the secured debt ratio 
increases between the date of the last financial statement and the case filing date. Ayotte and Morrison (2008) 
show that the average secured debt ratio in their sample of large U.S. companies increased from ca. 22% based on 
financial statements to almost 38% based on filing data. 
23 To further explore this issue, we have estimated two additional logit models for the probability of case success. 
The first one includes the secured debt ratio, which has a negative coefficient, but is not significant. The second 
model replaces the secured debt ratio by a dummy for the presence of secured debt. This secured debt dummy is 
significant with a negative sign: companies with secured debt, ceteris paribus, have a lower chance of successfully 
reorganizing as a going concern. Again – although it is only indirect evidence – this is consistent with the presence 
of a secured creditor-driven sale bias.  
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both are much lower than for reorganizations. Unfortunately, there is no systematic collection 
of recovery data in Belgium, so this issue cannot be further explored empirically. 
  
******************* 
Table 5 about here 
******************* 
 
In the next models in Table 5, we take a closer look at the impact of industry outlook on 
the effect of uncertainty by splitting up Uncertainty into Uncertainty*Normal or strong industry 
outlook and Uncertainty*Weak industry outlook. In model F, both interactions are negatively 
related to time spent in the procedure but only the latter interaction term is significant: 
uncertainty only leads to liquidation more quickly if the company is active in an industry with 
weak prospects. 
 
The next model reported in Table 5 (model G) builds on the model with the best fit so 
far (model F) but replaces the company-specific variables with the Altman Z”-score for 
financial distress (Financial health). This variable is significantly negatively related to the 
procedure length (at the 1% level), which is in line with the significant positive effect for 
Leverage found in some of the models, but the opposite of what one would expect in an 
efficient filtering system: companies in relatively limited distress are liquidated first, while 
companies with more severe financial difficulties are allowed to stay in the procedure the 
longest. Again, this suggests an important impact of the creditors on the length of the 
procedure: if financial distress is extremely high, the creditors’ recovery rates are likely to be 
low and their incentive to allow the reorganization to continue – while hoping for an unlikely 
recovery – is larger. The judicial system appears to be unable to identify these cases in a timely 
fashion, which can be interpreted as evidence of a continuation bias in the Belgian 
reorganization procedure. On the other hand, this result could also be driven by the fact that   27
companies in better financial health should be easier to value and sell at an acceptable price, 
which again points in the direction of a sale bias. 
 
The final model in Table 5, H, takes a closer look at the group membership variable. 
The fact that Group is significantly negatively related to procedure length in all models could 
either indicate that business groups may be able to find buyers for the failing company’s assets 
more quickly, or that creditors push for a fast liquidation. To distinguish between the two 
explanations we add information on the group’s financial health. Specifically, we split up the 
Group dummy according to whether or not the group is financially distressed according to 
Altman’s Z”-score. Both dummies remain significant, with a negative sign. The finding that 
subsidiaries of non-distressed groups are more quickly removed from the procedure supports 
the hypothesis that groups use their networks to terminate the problems of their struggling 
subsidiaries more quickly. The fact that this is also the case for subsidiaries of distressed 
groups, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, indicates that groups continue to use the remaining 
opportunities of their networks and/or that creditors push towards a quick removal from the 
procedure in order to limit resource shifting and moral hazard problems. In sum, the evidence 
concerning group ownership is likely to be more informative about the efficiency of business 
groups’ networks than about the reorganization procedure’s filtering ability, especially if 
groups are financially sound. A final point of notice in Table 5 is that the proxy for judicial 
experience, Cases per judge, is significant (at the 5 or 10% level) in all models: the more 
experience the average bankruptcy judge in a certain district has with reorganization cases, the 
shorter the length of the procedure. This could be due to learning effects, which allow for faster 
decision making by more experienced judges. 
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In the final Table, Table 6, we report results of logit-Weibull cure models for the full 
sample, i.e. including not only cases ending in liquidation bankrupty, but also those ending in 
voluntary liquidation or as a reorganized going concern. To limit the dimensions of the Table, 
only the failure time parts of the models are reported.
24 The variables included in the models in 
Table 6 are analogous to those in Table 5. The most important results (w.r.t. Group, Financial 
health, Uncertainty and the interaction terms with Uncertainty) remain unchanged and are 
therefore completely robust for the extension of the analysis to all cases. The most striking 
differences are that Leverage (which, as mentioned above, is borderline significant in Tables 4 
and 5) and Asset specificity (which is significant at the 5 or 10% level in all of the models in 
Tables 4 and 5) are not significant in the cure models reported in Table 6. This could indicate 
that leverage (as a proxy for case complexity and/or financial health) and asset specificity are 
only important in explaining the duration length for non-successful cases, or that the 
relationship between these variables and case duration is different for successful and 
unsuccessful cases. In theory, new AFT models could be estimated to examine the determinants 
of procedure length for successful cases separately. Unfortunately, because of the very low 
success rates in the Belgian reorganization procedure, our sample only includes 18 successful 









                                                 
24 In the logit part, only the Size variable is significant in all models: larger companies have a higher probability of 
being “cured”, i.e. being reorganized as going concern.   29
VII. Concluding remarks 
 
We consider a unique sample of mostly non-quoted Belgian companies that filed for 
reorganization between 1998 and 2003. As in other Continental European countries, success 
rates are very low: almost 80% of the completed cases end up in liquidation-type bankruptcy, 
while only 12% exit as going concern. Moreover, the average length of time spent in the 
procedure is long as compared to, for instance, cases in U.S. Chapter 11. In general, our results 
show the procedure does not result in efficient screening and filtering. Virtually all companies 
in the official records that apply for reorganization are allowed into the procedure, indicating 
that pre-entry screening is limited. To assess post-entry screening, we estimate hazard 
regression models of the determinants of time spent in unsuccessful reorganizations and cure 
models of the determinants of time spent in all reorganization cases. Overall results are not 
supportive of strong screening and filtering activity by the courts. We find no relationships 
between company level variables such as size, leverage, profitability and liquidity and time 
spent in the procedure. We do find evidence suggesting that the creditors’ stance towards 
reorganization is important: ceteris paribus, cases in which creditors most likely benefit from 
swift liquidation – i.e. companies with few specific assets active in industries subject to high 
uncertainty – are liquidated more quickly. Especially secured creditors appear to be important, 
which is not surprising given the strong hold-up rights allowed to them by the procedure. The 
fact that companies in the best financial health are liquidated first is supportive of a secured 
creditor-driven sale bias (cf. Ayotte and Morrison, 2008), as these companies are the most 
likely to be sold quickly for an acceptable price. Moreover, the fact that companies in the worst 
financial health – i.e. the companies which are the least likely to survive as going concerns – 
are allowed to stay in the procedure for the longest periods of time is consistent with a 
continuation bias. The filing company’s ownership structure matters as well: if the company is   30
part of a business group it is liquidated faster. Our evidence supports the notion that this is 
likely due to the fact that groups can use their networks to find buyers for their subsidiaries’ 
assets more quickly. Overall – analogous to Baird and Rasmussen’s (2002,2003) observations 
concerning Chapter 11 – our findings do not allow us to conclude that the Belgian procedure 
succeeds as an instrument to reorganize and save companies as going concerns. Instead, our 
results are consistent with the view that the procedure is often used as a device to sell assets or 
to formalize a pre-negotiated take-over or merger. 
 
In practice, the low effectiveness and survival rates we document in this paper have 
damaged the reputation of the reorganization procedure to the extent that its use has dropped to 
very low levels.  The Belgian Government is therefore planning a new reform of the legislation. 
One of the most important proposed changes is to replace the expensive, but professional 
administrator by a court official for smaller cases. The findings of this paper indicate that it is 
unlikely this will have important beneficial effects, as the reduction of direct costs cannot 
alleviate the problems of creditor control. Arguably, the most straightforward way of increasing 
success rates would be to reduce the power of creditors (especially secured creditors such as 
banks; see Brouwer, 2006). However, this could have an important negative impact on the 
willingness of banks to provide credit to firms in financial distress, which could lead to even 
fewer distressed companies being saved. Without a solution for this dilemma, the chances of 
success for any reform of the procedure are low. The theoretical conclusions which can be 
derived from Berkovitch and Israel (1999) or Hege (2003) may apply to the case of Belgium: 
informal reorganization and negotiation with creditors is of such paramount importance in a 
bank-based economy that the introduction of a dual chapter bankruptcy system may even 
decrease overall efficiency. In other words, it may be preferable to return to a liquidation-only 
system instead of allowing certain classes of secured creditors or business groups to extract   31
rents at the expense of, for instance, unsecured creditors. However, more research into the 
recovery rates of the liquidation and reorganization procedures for different classes of 
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Table 1 























Notes: Data on all reorganization procedures of limited liability stock corporations started between Jan 1
st, 
1998 and Dec 31
st,2003. Procedure status as of January 31
st, 2005.  
Panel A – Outcome of procedure  
 Number  of 
cases 
% of  
total cases 
% of  
completed 
cases 
Cases started  365     
Exit as liquidation-type bankruptcy  260   71.2%  79.0% 
Exit as voluntary liquidation  29  7.9%  8.8% 
Exit as going concern  40  11.0%  12.2% 
Not yet completed/unknown  36  9.9%   
Panel B – Duration of completed procedures in months 
 Average  Median  StDev  Min  Max 
All completed cases  12.3   7.6  11.8  0.7   54.8  
Exit as liquidation-type bankruptcy  9.4   6.6   8.4  0.7   51.2  
Exit as voluntary liquidation  12.5  7.4  14.2  2.9  47.8 
Exit as going concern  32.1   32.6  12.1  10.3   54.8    35
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Size  Natural logarithm of total assets 
Profitability  (Operating income)/(total assets) 
Liquidity  Quick ratio: (current assets – inventory)/(current liabilities) 
Leverage  Total leverage ratio: (total liabilities)/(total assets)
 (a) 
Asset specificity  (Fixed assets – land and buildings)/(total assets) 
(b) 
Financial health   Altman (1993) Z”-score 
(c) 
Uncertainty 
Industry average of the standard deviation of the operating profit 
margin  over the last 3 fiscal years  (based on 3-digit Nace codes) 
Secured debt  (Secured debt)/(total assets) 
Industry sales growth 
Industry average of the annual sales growth over the last 3 fiscal 
years (based on 3-digit Nace codes) 
Industry profit margin 
Industry average of the operating profit margin for the last fiscal year 
(based on 3 digit Nace codes) 
Group 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the filing company is part of a business 
group, i.e. if it has an incorporated owner which controls at least 50% 
of shares (directly or indirectly) or if the comments to the financial 
statements show intra-group ties 
Cases per judge 
(Number of reorganization cases handled in the judicial district 
during the sample period)/(number of full time commercial court 
judges in the judicial district) 
Region 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the case is handled by a court in a 
district with an average unemployment rate higher than the national 
median 
(a)  Because in a bankruptcy procedure all claimants are important, following Hotchkiss (1995) and Denis 
and Rodgers (2007), we include all liabilities (i.e. both interest bearing and non-interest bearing) in our 
leverage proxy instead of, for instance, including only financial debt. 
(b)  Note that we prefer asset specificity over a standard tangibility ratio because earlier research has shown 
that the relationship between tangibility and reorganization chances is not clear-cut.  Although 
availability of collateral helps to obtain credit, secured creditors are more likely to push for liquidation 
and to oppose a reorganization plan when the company falls on hard times (Bergström et al., 2002).   
(c)  The  Z”-score weighs four financial ratios: EBIT/(total assets), (book value of equity)/(total liabilities), 
(working capital)/(total assets) and (retained earnings)/(total assets). Higher Z”-scores indicate stronger 
financial health.        36
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Note: See Table 2 for definition of variables. 
(a) Statistics for the group member companies only. 
Panel A – Sample size distribution   
Total assets  % of sample 
< 500,000 EUR  20.9% 
500,000 – 2,500,000 EUR  46.8% 
2,500,000 – 10,000,000 EUR  24.7% 
> 10,000,000 EUR  7.6% 
  
Mean  4.5 million EUR 
Median  1.3 million EUR 
Panel B – Sample industry distribution   
Industry  % of sample 
Manufacturing 28.5% 
Construction 10.8% 
Trade (wholesale & retail)  28.5% 
Business services  19.6% 
Other 12.7% 
Panel C – Explanatory variables: summary statistics 
Variable Median  Mean  StDev 
Size 7.2233  7.2903  1.2680 
Profitability -0.0652  -0.1373  0.2004 
Liquidity 0.7965  0.7855  0.3985 
Leverage 0.9640  1.0467  0.3309 
Asset specificity  0.0271  0.0902  0.1299 
Financial health   -2.1776  -4.0262  6.4900 
Group financial health 
(a) -0.3751  -0.3967  3.1474 
Uncertainty 0.0608  0.0676  0.0235 
Secured debt  0.0000  0.1507  0.2535 
Industry sales growth  0.0755  0.0751  0.0390 
Industry profit margin  0.1151  0.1189  0.0297 
Group –  0.2468  – 
Cases per judge  4.0000 4.9916  3.0509 
Region  – 0.4937  –   37
Table 4 
Determinants of time spent in reorganization procedure before transfer to liquidation-type bankruptcy 
Notes: Accelerated Failure Time Models (Weibull distributed); Wald test statistics (χ² distributed) in parentheses; variables as defined 













  (A) (B) (B’)  (C)  (C’)  (D)  (D’) 






















































































































Industry sales growth  –  5.5916*** 
(16.282)  –  –  –  –  – 
Industry profit margin  –  –  3.7544 
(2.573)  –  –  –  – 
Uncertainty × 
Industry sales growth  –  –  –  62.5683*** 
(13.407)  –  –  – 
Uncertainty × 
Industry profit margin  –  –  –  –  62.1363** 
(4.337)  –  – 
Secured debt  –  –  –  –  –  -0.4325* 
(3.229)  – 
Uncertainty ×  
Secured debt  –  –  –  –  –  –  -7.5339* 
(3.581) 
Intercept 1.9282  1.6475  1.9138  2.0567  2.2248  2.7401  2.6876 
Scale 0.6624  0.5775  0.6185  0.5825  0.6115  0.6095  0.6084 
Shape 1.5097  1.7315  1.6168  1.7166  1.6352  1.6408  1.6438 
Industry dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
              
Log likelihood  -142.1  -128.0  -133.7  -129.2  -132.9  -133.0  -132.8 
Likelihood ratio test   5.0  33.3*** 21.8*  30.9***  23.5**  23.4**  23.7** 
                38
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Notes: Accelerated Failure Time Models (Weibull distributed); Wald test statistics (χ² distributed) in 
parentheses; variables as defined in Table 2; *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance 








  (E) (F) (G) (H) 
Size  -0.0260 
(0.232) 
-0.0330 
(0.428)  –  0.0089 
(0.030) 
Profitability  -0.4162 
(0.809) 
-0.3476 
(0.672)  –  -0.4227 
(0.977) 
Liquidity  0.1113 
(0.290) 
0.2536 
(1.321)  –  0.2269 
(1.107) 
Leverage  0.3146 
(1.464) 
0.4174* 
(2.774)  –  0.4139* 
(2.726) 
Asset specificity  1.1885* 
(3.635) 
1.2744** 
(4.501)  –  1.2882** 
(4.503) 
Financial health  –  –  -0.0304*** 
 (10.718)  – 





(14.148)  – 
Financially distressed group  –  –  –  -0.6920** 
(5.936) 
Non-financially  distressed  group  – – –  -1.3404*** 
(13.449) 
















Uncertainty  -9.0940*** 
(8.572)  – – – 
Uncertainty × Secured debt 
× Normal or strong industry outlook 
-3.8162 
(0.664)  – – – 
Uncertainty × Secured debt 
× Weak industry outlook 
-18.4439*** 
(7.629)  – – – 
Uncertainty × 













Intercept  2.5439 2.1200 2.5884 2.0525 
Scale  0.6022 0.5762 0.5832 0.5768 
Shape  1.6606 1.7354 1.7146 1.7338 
Industry  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Log  likelihood  -131.2 -127.7 -128.4 -127.5 
Likelihood ratio test   27.0**  33.9***  32.5***  34.3*** 
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Notes: Cure Models (Logit-Weibull); t-test statistics in parentheses; variables as defined in Table 2; *** 










  (I) (J) (K)  (L) 
Size  -0.0798 
(0.866) 
-0.0417 
(0.479)  –  -0.0400 
(0.424) 
Profitability  -0.8245 
(1.116) 
-1.1742 
(1.610)  –  -0.6686 
(0.907) 
Liquidity  -0.1079 
(0.306) 
-0.0355 
(0.339)  –  -0.0959 
(0.246) 
Leverage  -0.0571 
(0.124) 
-0.1124 
(0.245)  –  0.0009 
(0.002) 
Asset specificity  1.2252 
(1.289) 
0.2619 
(0.301)  –  0.7381 
(0.706) 
Financial health  –  –  -0.0394*** 
 (2.596)  – 





(3.969)  – 
Financially distressed group  –  –  –  -1.0894** 
(2.487) 
Non-financially  distressed  group  – – –  -1.5587*** 
(2.778) 
















Uncertainty  -13.3210*** 
(2.727)  – – – 
Uncertainty × Secured debt 
× Normal or strong industry outlook 
-4.8460 
(0.700)  – – – 
Uncertainty × Secured debt 
× Weak industry outlook 
-31.6868*** 
(2.866)  – – – 
Uncertainty × 













Scale  0.3675 0.3600 0.3574 0.3494 
Shape  1.3203 1.1066 0.9704 1.1141 
Industry  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Log  likelihood  -191.2 -187.9 -191.0 -185.7 
Likelihood ratio test   39.6**  46.2***  39.9***  50.6*** 
      